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Introduction
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) should become a permanent enterprise at Battalion and Brigade Staff echelons in order to improve the army's ability to conduct pacification/civil affair missions in counterinsurgency (COIN). Integrating a specifically PSYOP/CA (Civil Affairs) trained soldier will further increase the efficiency of COIN by acting as a staff cultural liaison and advisor. This soldier would also assist in developing Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) products to maximize intelligence collection, and non-lethal targeting. This direct involvement as a staff member will help integrate pacification efforts in a commander's area of operation (AO) and improve the course of actions that are recommended to the commander. Note text at bottom of pass. These leaflets were colorful so they would be easily visible in thick jungle. They were valid with the allied forces depicted on the flyer and helped recruit Vietcong soldiers for GVN forces.
forces be intermingled with GVN forces and the South Vietnamese populace and be controlled through a decentralized command structure at a provincial level. As one official at the time noted: "The key to achieving such security lays in the conduct of effective area saturation tactics, in and around populated areas, which deny Vietcong (VC) encroachment opportunities."
iii Unfortunately, the PROVN study was disregarded by the MACV command because it challenged the centralization of decision-making power of MACV and employed tactics that were anathema to the army that General Westmoreland commanded which was a "firepower- 
-Inclusion of PSYOP at Staff Level
As suggested, inclusion of PSYOP as a more integral staff member at BN and BDE will have significant impact in conducting COIN operations effectively and efficiently. I recommend that a staff-capable PSYOP SGT (E-6/E-7) or ideally, a company grade officer be included as a liaison to staff structure co-equal to the S2X (counterintelligence), for example. Granted, the small-size of the PSYOP community prevents this from currently being possible, but we must recruit for future conflicts not past ones. The bottom line: the PSYOP community's size needs to be increased. Also, further inclusion of PSYOP to staffs will improve coordination between the military-civil pacification efforts in an operation. As we saw in the Vietnam War, coordination is a complex enterprise; Including PSYOP at staff level will improve communication and efficiency.
-Include PSYOP products to improve IPB
The US Army's success in future COIN operations will also depend on soldiers' initiative to learn and understand the intersections of culture, media and tactical and strategic 
